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The Student as Philosopher-Scientist: Dewey’s 




Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation, which has been neglected 
by both philosophers of science and philosophers of education, fa-
cilitates overcoming the seeming divide between teaching a highly 
technical and specialized subject matter and encouraging students to 
successfully engage in the experience of being philosopher-scientists. 
By analyzing Dewey’s philosophy of science as it pertains to science 
education, we gain the insight that scientific explanation is a tool that 
may be used by students and supported by faculty to facilitate scientific 
investigation that is philosophical. Here I present Dewey’s conception 
of scientific explanation as it relates to science education by providing 
an overview of this conception as it relates to the student, followed by 
Dewey’s ideas with specific regard for science education, as well as an 
example illustrating how scientific explanation is utilized as a self-em-
powering, philosophical tool within the context of science education.
There is no question that the work of John Dewey has been invaluable with regard 
to theories of education. What has too often been neglected, however, is Dewey’s 
work on the philosophy of science as it pertains specifically to science education.1 
Although educators might well concede that children should be encouraged to be 
“philosophical” within the arts or humanities, most neglect or fail to heed Dewey’s 
insights concerning the child as philosopher-scientist within the science classroom. 
Dewey recognized that children were too often taught “science” while not learning 
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“the scientific way of treating the familiar material of ordinary experience” (MW 
9: 228). The view of science as a nonphilosophical, highly technical subject that is 
somehow fundamentally separated from other subjects remains a problem within 
education. Recently, for example, Victor Pollak criticized science education on this 
score, indicating the need for reconciliation between the “fundamentally antiau-
thoritarian spirit of science”—what Dewey considered the scientific, reconstructive 
manner of thinking—and “education, with its built-in tendency to be authoritar-
ian” (Pollak, 513). In what follows, I argue that Dewey’s conception of scientific 
explanation, which has often been neglected by both philosophers of science and 
philosophers of education, can assist us in overcoming the divide between teaching 
a highly technical and specialized subject matter and encouraging students to suc-
cessfully engage in “the scientific way of treating the familiar material of ordinary 
experience” (MW 9: 228). When students engage in scientific explanation as a tool 
that facilitates learning how to be scientific, rather than memorizing scientific ex-
planations as a series of facts, they can become philosopher-scientists.
Below, I present Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation as it relates to 
scientific education by first providing an overview of this conception in relation 
to the individual student. This is followed by more pointed discussion of Dewey’s 
thinking regarding science education, as well as examples illustrating how scientific 
explanation, as he sees it, should be utilized as a self-empowering philosophical tool 
within the context of science education. Accordingly, Dewey’s conception of scien-
tific explanation is connected with scientific education in a way that provides a basis 
for understanding how Dewey advocated an approach to education that fosters the 
child as philosopher-scientist, especially within the context of the science classroom.
As with so many concepts with which Dewey worked, his writing on this 
topic is infused with a very particular idea of explanation that is wedded to other 
concepts in his work and rooted in his theory of inquiry. The functional definition 
of explanation he supplies refers to “bringing a given set of cases into relation with 
sets that are of a different kind with respect to qualitative considerations so that 
free and systematic inference is possible” (LW 14: 24n24). However, this definition 
does not provide an adequate idea of Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation, 
especially in the realm of science education. The following, then, is an analysis of 
Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation that expands upon his very general 
functional definition.
For Dewey, scientific explanation is a particular kind of operation used in 
solving problems. Explanation in the context of education is, like any process in 
which students participate, born from transactions with the world of which students 
are a part. Most of students’ transactions with the world are unproblematic; expe-
riences occur and are undergone and accepted without question. However, when 
problems—caused by perturbations in the usually calm landscape of experience—
do occur, students are led to inquire into those problems in order to solve them so 
that experience will again be unproblematic and new understandings and abilities 
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can be acquired. Inquiry is the activity by which initial experience—that which is 
uncontrolled and indeterminate—is transformed via the interrelated processes of 
analysis and synthesis. Analysis is the process of discrimination by which experi-
ence is discriminated or divided into particular objects of experience. Synthesis 
is the process of identification wherein the objects of experience are unified as a 
whole (LW 8: 275). For instance, in attempting to understand the sense of hearing, 
we might analyze the ear into its various parts and the operations those parts per-
form. Once we have divided the ear in this manner, we might then (re)synthesize 
those parts and operations in order to understand how they function together to 
facilitate the sense of hearing.
 When problems occur, inquiry calls for observation of the facts at hand. 
Students discern objects of knowledge through the process of inquiry; as Dewey 
says, “objects of knowledge are not given to us defined, classified, and labeled, 
ready for labels and pigeonholes” (LW 1: 170). In order to discern objects of knowl-
edge which students deal with in the process of inquiry, experience is analyzed as 
data—discernible material of experience that is purposefully divided into distinct 
units so that how or why a problem has occurred might be understood. To return 
to our previous example, imagine that students experience perturbation over the 
nature of hearing—what makes it possible and how it works—after encountering 
and wrestling with the popular Zen koan, “If a tree falls in the woods and no one is 
there to hear it, does it really make a sound?” After identifying the source of their 
perturbation (the problem or questions to be answered) and hypothesizing possi-
ble resolutions through close examination of the ear, the analytic phase of inquiry 
might involve the division of the ear into the outer, middle, and inner ear. In the 
attendant process of synthesis, students utilize this data to formulate what Dewey 
calls ideas, suggestions for further inquiry or possible resolutions to the problem 
identified through the experienced perturbation (LW 8: 197-98). With regard to 
hearing, the analysis of the bones of the middle ear (malleus, incus, and stapes) 
could be utilized in the synthesis of these parts and their functions into the idea 
of the transmission of sound vibrations through material.  Between the analysis of 
experience into data and the synthesis of data into ideas, students search for solu-
tions to the problem by altering experience in order to test what particular effects 
are derived from what particular causes. 
The alteration of experience through inquiry brings about a type of experi-
ence distinct from so-called “primary” experience: what Dewey refers to as sec-
ondary or reflective experience. Secondary experience is experience that has been 
systematically analyzed and synthesized, and by which students attempt to gain an 
understanding of primary experience. Through the analytic function of secondary 
experience, scientific objects are applied to the problem identified within primary 
experience; scientific objects help students explain primary experience (LW 1: 15-16). 
In turn, the explanations generated via secondary experience are tested by whether 
or not they are warranted with regard to students’ ability to navigate through situa-
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tions within primary experience. In the reconstruction of primary experience into 
secondary experience, students engage in the process of locating and demarcating 
causes of the effects the students are attempting to explain.
An example of a primary experience in this context might be hearing a specific 
sound, such as that of knocking on wood. A causal question, informed by the previ-
ous inquiry, might then arise, “How does the sound get from out here [indicating 
the source of the sound] into your head?” Through the process of analysis, includ-
ing the location and demarcation of causes and effects concerning the transport of 
sound in hearing, the students begin forming an explanation, which is part of the 
their secondary experience. This means that the experience of inquiry is guided by 
the students as they engage in the construction of explanations pertaining to their 
primary experience.2
According to Dewey, the search for “efficient causes” is the aim of scientific 
practice; this is always “a search for those relations upon which the occurrence of 
real qualities and values depends, by means of which we can regulate their occur-
rence” (LW 4: 83). By varying the conditions through which various experiences 
occur, that is, through the process of intervention, students attempt to locate the 
source of the perturbation in their experience so that they can generate an under-
standing of the cause of the perturbation (the problem), as well as possible means 
of removing or diminishing it. In order to explain what is occurring in their expe-
rience, students must submit this experience to experimentation and the formula-
tion of hypotheses. As Dewey claims, students must “produce the cases” (LW 12: 
275). Through the repeated and varied production of cases, along with a fallibilist 
sensibility regarding preconceived notions about their experience, students engage 
in what Dewey refers to as the process of philosophical reconstruction.
Philosophical reconstruction, for Dewey, is the utilization of experimentation 
within inquiry. Students reconstruct when they regard their habitual approaches 
to experience—their past knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions that collectively 
predispose them to act in specific ways—as fallible. This process of evaluation and 
the implementation of experimental methods signifies the transition from naïve 
empiricism and mythic approaches regarding causality—the bare imposition of 
absolutistic concepts based upon singular experiences—to probabilistic thinking. 
Reconstruction is thus based upon students’ transactions with the world, and these 
ultimately supply them with the materials for inquiry. 
The process of reconstruction entails regarding intelligence—inquiry into 
experience and action—as purposeful and re-creative with regard to experience 
(MW 12: 108). In this process, students attempt to reconstruct the particular into 
the general—from token situations (i.e., experimental cases) to a type of situa-
tion—in order to formulate an explanation that may be used as a tool for similar 
situations in the future. Generalization has two distinct forms within the process 
of scientific explanation: that of classification of kinds (e.g., taxonomical or onto-
logical categories of inclusion) and that of hypotheses and theories, or universal if-
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then propositions (LW 12: 422). In the case of answering the question of how sound 
moves from one location “outside” of the head to somewhere “inside” of the head, 
the student engages in both of these forms of generalization. Classification occurs 
in conceptualizing sound and hearing (“What is sound? What is sound like? What, 
exactly, does it mean to ‘hear something’?”). Hypothesis-generation and theoriz-
ing occur in the process of addressing the problem at hand (“If the sound is gener-
ated in water, but my head is not underwater, does this change how I hear it? If I 
plug my ears, then I will not hear the sound, or I will only hear the sound faintly. 
If sound is a material thing, then it must have some kind of substance.”) This pro-
cess of generalization is not absolute, final or dogmatic; it is a continual process of 
identification and hypothesis-formation that is “to be worked out in practice, and 
to be rejected and expanded as [explanations] fail or succeed in giving our present 
experience the guidance it requires” (MW 12: 135). With regard to scientific expla-
nation, reconstruction involves the attempt to formulate causal relationships and 
their corresponding events so as to understand and possibly alter (for the better) 
particular experiences. As Dewey says, students explain these causal relationships 
and their corresponding events by drawing upon the inferred similarity of sets of 
experimental cases with qualitatively different sets of cases. Explaining scientifi-
cally thus guides understanding and action, based upon experimental inquiries, 
with regard to causing or inhibiting a specific type of effect.
In accordance with the above, a general definition for Dewey’s concept of 
explanation is as follows: E is an explanation if E provides a solution or guide to a 
solution for problem or question Q with specific regard to an individual’s or group’s 
inquiry into a particular experience or series of experiences. This experience or 
series of experiences is analyzed into data, through which scientific objects are re-
constructed. A scientific explanation will be based upon a series of experiments and 
the hypotheses that direct these experiments. The experiments are then general-
ized into secondary experience—conceptual language—that is applied to primary 
experience. The warranted assertibility (or “truth”)  of the scientific explanation 
within an educational context is based upon the combination of the real constraints 
and possibilities afforded by the engagement of students with their environment, 
the particular background considerations of the students (e.g., knowledge, habits, 
beliefs, assumptions) and the goals or concerns of the students in relation to Q that 
led to explanation seeking.
Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation fits seamlessly with his sugges-
tions for science education. These suggestions entail moving away from the mere 
dissemination of scientific knowledge—”knowing that”—as an object for student 
consumption (what education theorist Richard Duschl has aptly called “final form 
science” [69]). Instead, Dewey advocates that students “follow . . . the methods by 
which scientific men have reached their perfected knowledge.” He therefore stresses 
that students benefit from engaging in the same types of processes in which scien-
tists engage, recognizing that these processes entail the “methods of observation, 
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reflection, and testing” that make up scientific practice (MW 9: 228). This recom-
mendation is in line with Victor Pollak’s recognition “that an essential feature of 
science education is for the learner to participate in [the processes of scientific in-
vestigation and organization]” (515). Importantly too, studies of practices in sci-
ence education that stress students engaging in the processes of inquiry in which 
scientists engage also provide evidence that these practices lead to both students 
and teachers having improved attitudes regarding science (Kyle, Bonnstetter, and 
Gadsen).  And analysis of educational research clearly indicates that students ac-
tually do learn more efficiently and effectively as active participants, rather than 
as passive recipients (Lave). As Reiser, Berland, and Kenyon state, “If we expect 
students to learn that the scientific community builds knowledge by constructing 
explanations and arguments, then they must experience using these practices to 
address questions they have identified” (9). This is precisely the idea Dewey conveys 
with regard to science education. 
Dewey also recognizes the need for allowing students to make mistakes when 
engaged in scientific inquiry. As he states, “overzeal to select materials and appli-
ances which forbid a chance for mistakes to occur, restricts initiative, reduces judg-
ment to a minimum, and compels the use of methods which are so remote from 
the complex situations of life that the power gained is of little availability” (MW 9: 
205). The greatest danger when overprotective attempts are made to control stu-
dents’ learning how to think scientifically is that science becomes isolated “from 
significant experience” (228). When students are encouraged to locate and engage 
with problems in a manner that involves analysis, synthesis, and philosophical re-
construction—that is, the process of scientific explanation—they are engaging in 
the practice of being philosopher-scientists, discovering the antiauthoritarianism 
and strength of abstract thinking as it pertains to science. 
One possible criticism of this approach is that the students might make mis-
takes that go uncorrected, that is, they might construct and internalize aberrant 
explanations that the teacher knows are incorrect. However, as Reiser et al. indicate 
in their analysis of an explanation-based framework for science education, “devel-
oping explanatory accounts includes not only construction but also comparison 
and critique. Attempts to construct new explanations typically require elements of 
argumentation to support and challenge potential explanations” (9). In other words, 
student explanations are not accepted carte blanche, especially by other students. 
Rather, explanations are proposals for solving problems that are recognized through 
the process of inquiry, and therefore those explanations are examined through the 
processes of experimentation and argumentation. So, in the example concerning 
hearing, a student could put forth an explanation that entailed small leprechauns 
carrying pieces of what we call sound from the source of the noise to our brains, 
but this explanation would be dismissed fairly quickly through the process of ar-
gumentation. This same type of process has been recorded by Nadia Kennedy with 
regard to mathematical inquiry. The particular example she provides is that of stu-
E&C   Education and Culture
76     Mark D. Tschaepe
dents attempting to explain, and constructing arguments concerning, the concept 
of infinity (Kennedy). These explanations are not dismissed by the teacher or some 
figure of authority, but through the processes in which the students engage together. 
Engaging in the practice of being philosopher-scientists, especially with re-
gard to the formation and utilization of scientific explanation, entails the creation 
of abstract concepts. According to Dewey, this is one of the most useful functions 
of science. The scientist, as well as the student as philosopher-scientist, develops 
abstractions “like a manufacturer of tools who does not know who will use them 
or when” (MW 9: 234). Rather than merely being told that such-and-such scientific 
explanations hold in such-and-such situations, the student as philosopher-scientist 
creates scientific explanations through an experimental process that gradually leads 
to the creation of abstractions that are to be tested against experience and held at 
ready for future problem solving. In the case of explaining the sensation of hearing, 
students begin by constructing explanations pertaining to a particular instance of 
hearing, but this is simply an initial step in creating abstractions that pertain to 
many instances of hearing, as well as other sensory experiences. As Dewey states, 
“scientific formulation supplies one with tools for constructing new experiences 
with transformed meanings” (235-36). This engagement in the process of scientific 
explanation is not only relevant to science education, as if science education was 
divided from other educational processes. Scientific explanation, especially in the 
context of science education, is also philosophical.
The creation and confirmation of abstract concepts derived from observation, 
experimentation, and scientific explanation provide tools for future use, especially 
with regard to future problematic situations. This process falls under the aegis of 
what Dewey defines as philosophy: “an idea of what is possible, not a record of ac-
complished fact” (MW 9: 336). The value of philosophy is shared with the value of 
scientific explanation. Engaging in the philosophical process of scientific explana-
tion within the context of science education aids “in defining difficulties and sug-
gesting methods for dealing with them” (336). Note that this process also contrib-
utes to Dewey’s technical concept of education: “reconstruction or reorganization 
of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability 
to direct the course of subsequent experience” (82-83). The student thus engages 
in philosophical thinking, not within some realm partitioned off from the rest of 
education, but within all realms of education, including science education.
Another possible objection to advocating that science education entail stu-
dents becoming philosopher-scientists, especially at the elementary school level, is 
that children, developmentally, could not possibly engage in such complex endeav-
ors as analysis, synthesis, and reconstruction of problematic phenomena. Looking 
at a hypothetical example, as well as other documented examples, this seems to 
be a red herring. Consider, for instance, if elementary school students were shown 
owl pellets and then freely inquired, through their own experienced perturbation, 
“What are these?” The teacher might then ask, “How can we determine that?,” and 
then once the students begin to discern what the owl pellets are: “What kinds of 
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food do owls eat?” and “How would you determine this?” It does not seem difficult 
to concede that most children whose interest was piqued in this way would want 
to investigate these problematic questions, formulating their own explanations, as 
scientists do, based upon observation and rudimentary experiment. In fact, children 
do not necessarily need to be presented with specific objects of analysis in order to 
engage in the process of being philosopher-scientists: often, by simply not limiting 
them from imaginative investigation of the world, we encourage children’s scientific 
engagement with it. An example of such engagement can be seen in Lowell Getz 
who, as a child in rural Illinois, came to the hypothesis that prairie voles were mo-
nogamous through the process of exploring farm fields and becoming entranced 
by finding male and female prairie voles consistently together. This childhood en-
gagement led to a career as a zoologist and the founding of studies in prairie vole 
behavior that eventually led to major strides in neuroendocrinology and research 
on hormones. (In fact, Getz published a paper in 1974, “Fun in Research,” that is 
consistent with Dewey’s conceptions of science and education). Without artificial 
limitations imposed on him, Getz was able to freely engage in the actual process of 
scientific inquiry and explanation.
Such active inquiry is also advocated by Brooksfield and Preshill in a more 
directive form by proposing questions that ask for clarification, that are hypotheti-
cal, that address cause-and-effect relationships, and that entail analysis and synthe-
sis of problems (Brooksfield and Preshill). Evidence indicates that children, in fact, 
do benefit from these types of open-ended scientific inquiry. In Developing More 
Curious Minds, for instance, John Barell provides numerous examples of successful 
science education that utilizes Dewey’s principles of reconstruction and provides 
platforms for students to be philosopher-scientists. What such examples indicate is 
that students, when provided with a context for open-ended inquiry, successfully 
engage in tasks, such as direct observation and synthesis of prior knowledge, which 
are considered conceptual standards for scientific education from ninth through 
twelfth grade (Barell, 30). 
One of the most outstanding examples Barell provides is that of an eighth-
grade student, Amber Overstreet, who had observed tropical fish living in a fresh 
water pond 157 miles from where they would naturally live. Through her own in-
terest and active inquiry, Overstreet questioned how the fish survived. She system-
atically investigated water temperatures, which led her to discover a warm water 
spring that provided the fish with a survivable, natural habitat. From this, she for-
mulated a scientific explanation stating that, given the constant temperature of water 
in a given area, the tropical fish would survive (Barell, 33-34). This is one example, 
among many others, that Barell provides indicating student success in generating 
scientific explanation when those students are provided with the opportunity to 
be philosopher-scientists. 
Two researchers in science education, William A. Sandoval and Brian J. Reiser, 
have created a computer program for science education, the ExplanationConstructor, 
based upon explanation-driven inquiry. They designed it, in part, as a way to reject 
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the notion of science education as a process “where theoretical ideas are presented 
as incontrovertible facts” (Sandoval and Reiser, 346). Accordingly, the program is 
a tool that facilitates students engaging in the philosophical-scientific practice of 
generating causal explanations and reconstructing data in order to effectively ar-
gue for those explanations. In their initial studies of the ExplanationConstructor, 
Sandoval and Reiser found that it functioned as an epistemic tool that aided in the 
construction of explanations and the analysis of data. Their goal in these studies 
was not to evaluate the effectiveness of their program (366). What their findings 
do indicate, though, is that students are, in fact, able to engage in complex forms of 
scientific explanation generation and reconstruction. Science education is therefore 
not necessarily restricted to an authority-based or lecture-based form of delivery, 
especially regarding the subject of causal explanations.
Another possible retort to the idea of the student as philosopher-scientist 
could be that this is simply not how children learn, that they require more directive 
instruction and formal structures. However, analysis of how the brain functions 
and engages in what is often referred to as “higher-order thinking” indicates that 
the philosophical reconstructive activities that Dewey proffered, such as the for-
mulation of scientific explanations and hypothesis generation, provide a successful 
foundation from which students become critical thinkers who are able to address 
and solve complex problems (Sousa). With regard to brain development, moreover, 
David A. Sousa notes the importance of self-concept, which is the student’s sense of 
identity, in this case, with regard to a particular subject matter (57-60). This sense 
of identity is an important aspect of science education that is arguably strength-
ened by approaching the child as philosopher-scientist. Through active, positive 
investment in the subject matter, the student becomes emotionally receptive to the 
problems encountered, the processes by which those problems are addressed, and 
the solutions to those problems. The latter is positively reinforced and contributes 
to the student’s self-concept because the solutions are created through the process 
of scientific explanation generated by the student. This approach to science educa-
tion also contributes to memory retention because of the positive association with 
the subject matter provided by the student’s personal investment.3
Unless instructed to do otherwise, children do not hesitate to engage in what 
Pollak has called the “being mode” of learning, wherein they take an “interest in 
exploring and in playing with various facets of the subject or activity at hand” (Pol-
lak, 515). This is the very basis of activity that Dewey advocated for meaningful 
education. The value of such activity is not based upon how accurately the scientific 
explanations put forth by the students match those accepted explanations within 
textbooks, but instead upon the ability of the students’ explanations to resolve their 
present difficulties (LW 13: 232). As their educations continue, students continue to 
put forth, examine, negate, improve upon, and utilize their scientific explanations 
created from their own inquiries. If sustained, this type of activity becomes that of 
the philosopher-scientist, even within elementary school.  
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As demonstrated above, Dewey’s conceptions of education and experience 
entail the philosophical components of analysis, synthesis, and reconstructive think-
ing. This is especially true with regard to his conceptions of scientific education. One 
of the greatest tools Dewey offers for students (and teachers) in the context of science 
education is scientific explanation understood as a process in which the students 
engage rather than a product that the teachers are to deliver. By understanding and 
pursuing Dewey’s conception of scientific explanation and how it can be utilized 
within science education, we come to a greater understanding of how students can 
engage in the experience of being philosopher-scientists. 
Ultimately, the child as philosopher-scientist develops the skills of critical 
thought—such as reflection, abstraction, question generation, hypothesis forma-
tion, analogy—that provide a philosophical foundation for engaging in science as 
well as democratic citizenry. In addition, the child as philosopher-scientist begins 
to learn and implement the process of argumentation, which is a key component to 
generating and utilizing scientific explanations for solving problems. This is in stark 
contrast to the child who is not provided with the opportunity to be philosophical, 
or, worse, is trained to be nonphilosophical while engaging in scientific investiga-
tion. A nonphilosophical approach to science consists in the mere rote memoriza-
tion of data and methods involving little to no critical inquiry. The student who is 
denied philosophical thought has fewer tools to develop, aside from that of passive 
memory and other unreflective processes. The philosopher-scientist develops a foun-
dation in the same core of information, and, more importantly, a critical disposi-
tion toward multiple subjects that contributes to the development of higher-order 
thinking and processes of thought that creatively and actively contribute to solving 
problems and a life well lived. By fostering the child as philosopher-scientist, we 
thereby facilitate the development of thoughtful members of a larger democratic 
community of inquirers who are equipped to adapt to the ever-changing environ-
ment of which they are a part. 
Notes
1.  For an interesting collection of quotations from Dewey concerning his philosophy 
of science in science education, see Ansbacher.
2.  This aspect of student-guided questioning is addressed in more depth with regard 
to mathematics education by Nadia Kennedy in this volume. 
3.  Regarding the ability for students to construct memories linked to positive emo-
tions, see LaBar and Phelps. 
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